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Distinguished Lecture on Economics in
Government
The Private Uses of Public Interests:
Incentives and Institutions
Joseph Stiglitz
As a long-time student of the public sector, I welcomed the opportunityto come to Washington as a member of the Council of Economic Advi-sers and later to become the Chairman of the Council, partly because it
gave me an opportunity to study at first hand this immensely important part of
our economy and society and to test my ideas against the reality of government
in action.
To be sure, I came also as an activist, if not with a fully articulated agenda, at
least with a view about what it was that government should, and should not be doing.
My reference point was the fundamental theorems of welfare economics which, as
some describe them, proved that the market left to itself would produce efficient
allocations. Many saw in these theorems the vindication of Adam Smith's faith in
the invisible hand leading the self-interested decisions of each person to maximize
the well-being of the nation as a whole. Today, many of us look at the fundamental
theorem not as a description of the world, but as an explication of the conditions
under which a market equilibrium will be Pareto efficient. These conditions are
quite strong. The importance of some of the more explicit assumptions—like the
lack of externalities and the completeness of markets—has long been known. In
the last two decades, we have explored much more seriously the consequences of
the informational assumptions implicit in the belief that markets are efficient. In
particular, it has been shown that in the presence of imperfect information or
incomplete markets, the economy will not be Pareto efficient; in other words, there
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will always be some intervention by which the government can make everyone better
off (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986).'
Nineteen ninety-three was a great year to arrive in Washington. The first two
years of the Clinton administration were extremely active. The ideas and policies
that had been pent up in the Democratic party during the previous 12 years of
Republican presidents were all discussed in concurrent meetings. Although certain
issues dominated the attention of the economics team—the budget, trade relations
with Japan, and health care, for example—there was also space for a lot of inde-
pendent initiatives, some small, some large. Later, I shall describe the fate of several
of these.
Some of my friends who had spent a spell in Washington suggested that I would
return a bit wiser for the experience, a bit more jaundiced about the role of gov-
ernment. That seems a shared experience: a better understanding of government
failures to counterbalance the market failures that have occupied so much of my
thinking as a professional economist.
Today, I want to share with you some of my thoughts about the possibilities
and limitations of government. These thoughts are focused around a simple ques-
tion: Why is it so difficult to implement even Pareto improvements? I knew the
immense complexity of political decisions involving trade-offs among different
groups. But surely, if we as economists had anything to contribute, it would be to
identify Pareto improvements, changes (perhaps complex mixes of policies) which
held out the prospect of making some people better off without making anyone
worse off. I quickly saw that although a few potential changes were stricUy Pareto
improvements, there were many other changes that would hurt only a small, nar-
rowly defined group (for example, increasing the efficiency of the legal system
might hurt lawyers). But if everyone except a narrowly defined special interest
group could be shown to benefit, surely the change should be made. In pracdce,
however, "almost everyone" was rarely sufficient in government policy-making and
often such near-Pareto improvements did not occur. My major theme will be to
provide a set of explanations for why this might be so.
Of course, to critics of the role of government, these disappointments
should not have come as a surprise: they were the predictable consequences of
the government failures that are no less marked than the market failures to
which I alluded earlier. I was, of course, aware of these government failures, and
indeed had written about them. One of the reasons I looked forward to coming
to Washington was to study them more closely, and Washington gave me a wealth
of experience on which I shall draw for years to come. But the analytics of gov-
ernment failure have always seemed to me to be on less firm ground than the
analytics of market failure. For instance, critics of the role of government have
put forward two, somewhat inconsistent arguments. One is that government is
' More precisely, the economy is not even constrained Pareto efficient There exist government interven-
tions which can lead to a Pareto improvement, even while respecting the imperfections of information
and the incompleteness of markets and taking the costs of gathering information and establishing mar-
kets into account.
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not needed: Coasian bargaining leads to efficient solutions, even for situations,
like externalities, where interventionists claim that government has a role. The
other is that government is rife with inefficiencies, such as those associated with
rent-seeking. The argument seems to be that while Coasian bargaining works in
the private sector, it fails to work in the public sector, for reasons that are not
usually explained. If Coasian bargaining worked well, surely Pareto improve-
ments would quickly be agreed to, both within the public and private sectors.
However, the conditions under which Coase's conjecture is correct are suffi-
ciently restrictive as to provide little guidance either for when markets might fail
or government actions might improve matters.^
I shall put forward four hypotheses in this lecture, each of which provides
part of the explanation for the failure in at least one instance of a proposed
Pareto improvement. These hypotheses, like much of the literature on govern-
ment failures, focus on the role of incentives: how misaligned incentives can
induce government officials to take actions that are not, in any sense, in the
public interest.
I should remark at the outset that the limitations run deeper, into the so-
ciology and anthropology of the political scene. When I was in the lav^er- and
politician-dominated White House environment, I often felt that I had arrived
in another world. It was not just that another language was spoken. I understood
and expected that; every culture (including that of economists) creates its own
language to set itself apart. It was that often another system of logic, another set
of rules of reasoning, applied. I had expected lower standards of evidence for
assertions than would be accepted in a professional article, but I had not ex-
pected that evidence offered would be, in so many instances, so irrelevant, and
that so many vacuous sentences, sentences whose meaning and import simply
baffled me, would be uttered. A so-called foreign policy expert would claim with
fervor that we must maintain our "credibility." Surely, no one would dispute
that. The issue was, what was the theory and evidence concerning the relations
between particular actions and "credibility," however that was defined. What
credibility meant and how it was established seemed issues beyond rational in-
quiry. Empirical evidence—at least beyond an anecdote or two—and theoretical
analysis should have been able to shed light on the merit of alternative policies.
While that is where the conversation should have begun, it almost never got that
far. What occurred was often worse than Gresham's Law: it was not only that bad
arguments seemed to drive out good, but good economists, responding to im-
plicit incentives, adopted bad arguments to win their battles. In a process of
cognitive dissonance reduction, possibly combined with some intellectual atro-
phy, sometimes good economists even seemed to come to believe their specious
arguments.
Nevertheless, there were also some Pareto or near-Pareto improvements that
were successfully done: some with surprising difficulty, some with—given the
' See Farrell (1987), Dixit and Olson (1997), Stiglitz (1994).
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difficulties of getting anything done—surprising ease. Before embarking on our
discussion on the reasons for some of our failures, let me describe two of our
successes.
Some Successful Pareto Improvements
The two examples of Pareto improvements are not grand policies, like an at-
tempt to redo the nation's health care system. But they are the sort of incremental
policies that can add up and make a difference.
One was pension reform. Pensions represent one of the most important forms
of savings in the United States, and a critical source of economic security for the
aged. But pension coverage, after rising rapidly in the years after World War II, was
stagnating, and even declining. And for good reason: the costs of administering
these pension programs was soaring, especially for small businesses. In part, this
was due to the high administrative costs required to comply with the incredibly
complex tax code that had evolved to prevent well-paid executives from taking
advantage of the tax advantages of pensions, and to ensure equitable treatment of
workers.
As part of Vice President Albert Gore's initiative to reinvent government, I
proposed pension simplification. We put together a model pension program (re-
ferred to as a "safe harbor"), which would eliminate all the red tape if a firm
subscribed to it. The idea resonated, especially with small business, and was enacted
as part of a more comprehensive package of pension reforms (including pension
portability). Subsequently, at least some businesses which previously felt that they
could not afford to do so began to offer pensions to their employees.^ The ease
with which this major change was accomplished made me wonder: Why hadn't it
happened earlier?*
A second successful initiative was inflation-indexed bonds, which provide a way
for households and the government to reduce their risks. At the same time, they
'' While the reform was an important step in the right direction, I am not optimistic about a reversal of
the downward trend in coverage among low-wage workers. The lack of pension demand among from
these workers—who derive smaller tax advantages from pensions—may be the more important driving
force. There may be good reasons for the decline in demand, including improved Social Security cov-
erage and lower marginal tax rates. If so, the reforms may not lead to an extensive expansion of pension
coverage. Still, the reform is a Pareto improvement.
•* The answer, I think, has to do with the second reason for the failure to adopt Pareto-improvements
noted below: the bargaining game in which so much of political decision is embedded. Unions wanted
stronger "equity" requirements; for example, not only that employers offer "fair" pension treatment,
but that there be "equitable" take-up rates. This was perhaps because they did not trust management—a
plan that looked fair might be implemented in such a way as to discourage worker participation. Perhaps
they thought that these more stringent rules would encourage a more pro-active stance by employers to
enroll their employees. In practice, though, what was happening was that the stringent rules were dis-
couraging employers from providing any pension plan—making workers worse off. The ultimate rec-
ognition of this pattern, combined with the weakening of unions themselves, may have created the
climate for meaningful pension reform.
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create a market that did not previously exist,^  and the government reaps some of
the benefits of this new market in the form of lower interest charges on its debt.
(Because "real" risk is reduced, the risk premium should be smaller.)
Despite these obvious attractions—and the fact that very few people would be
hurt by the innovation—getting the Clinton administration to accept indexed
bonds was a long and difficult process. There were three reasons for this. First, it
was enormously difficult explaining the nature of the real risk faced by the govern-
ment. Critics worried that if inflation increased, interest payments would increase.
Try as we might, I think some never understood that the government's tax receipts
also went up with inflation and thus indexed bonds actually reduced the govern-
ment's real risk.
Second, some misguided inflation hawks thought that indexing would reduce
the resolve of government to fight inflation.® As is so often the case with such
inflation hawks, they did not bother to look at the relevant empirical literature
(Fischer, 1996, provides a survey), or at the counterargument that with indexed
bonds, inflation has an immediate and direct budgetary impact, thus encouraging
governments to act against it.
The third reason was that Treasury turned to bond traders—their natural cli-
entele—for advice. The experience in England ybm the perspective of bond traderswzs
that these bonds were a failure; that is, people bought them for their retirement
and did not trade them. Without trades, where were their commissions? Of course,
from the perspective of someone trying to create an instrument to enhance retire-
ment security, this was ideal: we did not want a gambling instrument. The bond
traders raised anxiety levels: Would Treasury throw a party to which no one would
come? We at the Council had our independent ways of ascertaining interest in the
market—we talked to some large mutual funds and other financial institutions,
market makers who understood the economics behind indexed bonds, and they
were enthusiastic. As it turned out, our assessment of the market was far more
accurate than that of the bond traders—the issue in January 1997 was an enormous
success, in spite of the fact that, given the uncertainty at that time about the prob-
lems of measuring infiation, it could not have been a worse time to issue them.'
Four Reasons Why Potential Pareto Improvements Fail
Having spent a few moments on successes, I will now tum to four hypotheses
that explain a number of the failures to implement Pareto or near-Pareto improve-
ments. The list of failures is a long one—ranging from the more obvious ones in
'' Our analysis had shown that there did not exist any security, or combination of assets, which systemat-
ically provides anything close to full insurance against the risks of inflation.
" The argument is based on the premise that unless inflation hurts—and hurts not just bondholders but
also workers and retirees—there will not be sufficient public resolve to fight inflation. But indexing can
reduce the pain of inflation, at least among retirees.
' In this journal, Wilcox (1998) provides an evaluation of the success of the indexed bond issuance.
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trade and agriculture policy* to those in social, health, and environmental policy.
The failure of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reform and the inability
to implement economic incentives in home health care are a few specific examples
which come to mind. In reality, many of the policies I describe are near-Pareto
improvements, which bring diffuse benefits to a large group but at a well-defined
cost for a narrowly defined group. In some of these cases, feasible compensation
was proposed to make it a strict Pareto improvement; in other cases, it was not.
More complex are changes such as the elimination of the step-up in basis for capital
gains combined with changes in estate and capital gains tax rates that would reduce
distortions, raise revenue, and improve investors' welfare as a group although par-
ticular investors might indeed be hurt.
The traditioncil answer to these questions is Mancur Olson's Logic of Gollective
Action (1971) which argued that it is hard to overcome the free rider problem in
organizing a large group to defend itself against a concentrated interest.® This
answer, however, is incomplete because it does not explain why policies that harm
no one or involve compensation fail to be adopted. My four hypotheses, in attempt-
ing to understemd the unique nature of government's powers and limitations, ad-
dress this issue.
1. The Inability of Government to Make Commitments
Policy-making is a dynamic process, with today's decisions shaping options and
coalitions in the future. In the naive view, a Pareto improvement is a one-shot, static
policy change. In reality, it is part of a sequence of policies, and although a reform
may be favorable to all groups in earlier stages of that process, it may undermine
one or a few groups' interests in later stages. These disadvantaged groups, of course,
are often far-sighted enough to anticipate that in the long run they will be worse
off and thus act accordingly to oppose a seeming Pareto improvement.
Early on in the Clinton administration, we put forward a National Action Plan
to address the problems of global warming. Among the myriad of actions was a
small one which represented a Pareto improvement: making better use of the na-
tion's hydroelectric sites. The government enterprises that currently run many pub-
lic dams sell electricity at far below the fair market price. The plants set prices at
or slighdy above their cost of production but, because hydro-electricity is much
cheaper to produce than the more common coal-generated electricity, the prices
of the government enterprises are lower than the marginal cost of electricity pro-
duced by the entire generating system. In many cases, the government enterprises
" Some failures in these fields are not so obvious, I describe two examples below: the possibility of using
auctions to allocate the subsidies under the export enhancement program (EEP) and the "self-help"
agriculture program. We managed to get the possibility of EEP auctions included as part of the 1996
farm bill, but there have not yet been any regulations implementing the idea,
" There are other explanations which could also play a role—but they too are far from complete. For
example, the "prospect theory" associated with Kahneman and Tversky (1991) argues that people are
"loss averse," that they are far more sensitive to losses from the status quo than to gains. This might
help to explain why the status quo often seems to have such sway; losers scream louder and invest more
in blocking policy changes.
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lack the budget to finance additional investment which would allow them to pro-
duce more electricity, still at a price far below the cost of coal-generated power.
Our proposal addressed these concerns by allowing private firms to bid for the right
to make these incremental investments and sell the additional electricity at market
prices. We designed the proposal to be a Pareto improvement, ensuring that current
recipients of "subsidized" electricity would continue to receive the amount of elec-
tricity previously produced at the existing prices. The proposal was good for our
budget (substantial revenues were anticipated from selling the rights); it was good
for the economy (marginjil cost pricing combined with replacing expensive elec-
tricity with cheap electricity); and it was good for the environment (increasing the
non-carbon-emitting production of electricity). And since those who were already
getting electricity at subsidized prices from the government would be able to con-
tinue doing so, no one would be hurt.
But of course, the answer depended on what implicit property rights people
thought they already had and how this initiative might affect existing property
rights. If those who currently had access to subsidized electricity thought that even-
tually they would be able to get an increased supply at the subsidized price by public
investments in upgrades of existing sites, then the change was, from their perspec-
tive, a change for the worse.
Probably more important was the principle: once the principle of opportunity
cost pricing was accepted, once it became clear that, in effect, those who were
obtaining hydro-electricity at "cost"—but far below market price—were in effect
being subsidized, it would be only a matter of time before the subsidy was elimi-
nated. Our modest initiative was viewed as the "thin edge of the wedge," a "slippery
slope" down which those who benefitted from the current setup simply did not
want to risk going.'"
There were two problems. The first was that the reform would make the effec-
tive subsidy transparent and, in doing so, would undermine its political viability.
The second was that we could not make a credible commitment that these subsidies
would be continued. The two problems are related: the increased transparency
made it less likely that the subsidies would be continued and put further pressure
on our inability to make commitments.
The concern about increased transparency is important, but does not fully
account for the resistance. After all, we now make the cost of the myriad tax ex-
penditures transparent. Yet this information, calculated annually, reported in the
budget, and highlighted by the Congressional Budget Office's regular compendium
of "worst offenders," has not sufficed to make much of a dent on even the most
egregious examples, from ethanol to the subsidy for corporate jets.
The problem of commitment stems from the inherent nature of government
itself. Government is the primary enforcer of contracts. It uses its monopoly on the
'" While such arguments obviously have persuasive value, it is questionable how valid they really are; for
instance is; it empirically true that the probability of a subsidy being ehminated at time /+1 rises if the
subsidy is reduced at time t, taking into account the fact that the reduction of the subsidy may imply a
change in the political weights involved?
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legal use of force to create the possibility of private commitment. There is no one,
however, whose job it is to guard the guardian. The government cannot make
commitments because it always has the possibility of changing its mind, and earlier
"agreements" cannot be enforced.
The inability to make commitments causes another set of inefficiencies: the
cost of creating next-best credibility-enhancing mechanisms. While those in gov-
ernment at one date cannot commit future governments, they can affect the trans-
actions costs of reversing the policies." Public choice scholars such as James Buch-
anan (1975, 1991) have argued that the Constitution represents a form of com-
mitment, since it increases the costs of some policy reversals such as those pertaining
to civil rights. My analysis suggests three extensions to these arguments: first, there
are a range of forms of actions which affect transactions costs and thereby make
change difficult; second, these transactions costs, by making change difficult, can
impede what would appear to be Pareto improvements; and third, while some trans-
actions costs may have been desirable for those who created them, changes in the
world may make them obstacles to efficient reform.
The issue of commitment is especially important in establishing the compensa-
tions which are frequently associated vdth Pareto-improving policies. For example,
in the United States an elaborate set of government Jirrangements keeps the price
of milk well above its competitive market price. An attempt to expand this legally
sanctioned cartel-like arrangement was pushed forward under the euphemism of
"self-help," but the cartel arrangement's lack of budgetary cost sind nice-sounding
tide did not make it any less objectionable. A cartel by any other name is just as
odious. The annual welfare cost is huge and would have been even greater under
the proposed expansion. Poor children are hit especially hard—the higher price of
milk, for instance, seriously erodes a substantial fraction of the value of the govern-
ment subsidy for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) and for school lunches.
It should be possible to eliminate this cartel and still be able to compensate dairy
producers with direct non-distortionary payments that leave them better off. Dairy
fanners would be reluctant to agree to this change because the direct compensation
is more visible than price fixing, and thus more vulnerable to political pressure for
cuts later on. Even if the government promised to maintain the dairy payments, in
the absence of a commitment mechanism it is unlikely that the dairy industry would
believe those payments would be as politically secure as price fixing, especially if they
can get away with a sweet-sounding name such as "self-help." Capitalizing the value
of the cartel profits and receiving that amount as lump-sum payments at the termi-
nation of the program eliminates that risk but introduces a new one: the industry
cannot commit itself not to try to reinstate the cartel at some later date.
Another example is provided by our attempt to rationalize the U.S. air traffic
control system, and to institute congestion pricing. The failures of our current system
" One example of this effect in action comes from Vickers and Yarrow (1988), They argue that the
British government deliberately sold shares in some privatized enterprises at below market prices to a
broad spectrum of the population in order to create a forceful constituency which would resist rena-
tionalization.
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have moved from amusing stories—government computers that still use vacuum
tubes that have to be purchased in Poland—to real fears of an inability to handle
the demands of the coming decades. We devised an effective set of reforms that
included user fees more closely reflecting "market" prices.'^ But the owners of cor-
porate jets and small planes—who currendy get close to a free ride—were an effective
lobby in stopping these reforms, because they realized that the move to a more
market-based system would inevitably entail their having to pay their fair share. There
was simply no commitment that we could make that had any credibility.'*
The limitations on the ability to make commitments are reflected too in
how Congress goes about its business. Congress recognizes, for instance, that
gridlock caused by local interests might prevent military base closings, although
the country as a whole would benefit from these closures. It set up a base closure
commission, committing itself to vote the entire set of recommendations of the
commission up or down. Similarly, Congress has recognized that special interest
pressures would, under normal procedures, make ratification of trade treaties
as negotiated all but impossible—and that foreigners' recognition of this would
make trade negotiations all but impossible. Accordingly, Congress has repeat-
edly passed "fast track" legislation, committing itself to vote trade agreements
up or down, without amendments.
2. Coalition Formation and Bargaining
The second hypothesis for the failure to gain near-Pareto improvements is
based on the theory of coalition formation and bargaining. One of the strongest
objections to those who believe that Coase-style bargaining will reach efficient out-
comes is that with imperfect information, such bargaining often results in subop-
timal outcomes (Farrell, 1987). To convey information about bargaining resolve,
fallback positions, and so on, there is often recourse to inefficient signals. Bargain-
ing in life is also not a one-shot episode. Each round affects the fallback position
for the next. Although the two sides in, say, a labor dispute may not fully realize it,
each is solving a complicated dynamic program problem with uncertainty and im-
perfect information. Strikes are a manifestation of "bargaining" inefficiency in the
private sector; the failure to enact Pareto improvements is a manifestation in the
public.
One vivid example comes from the attempts to reform one of the most glaring
inefficiencies in our environmental laws, the legal framework for dealing with toxic
wastes: Superfund, as it is commonly called. For toxic waste sites with more than
one responsible party—the vast majority of targeted sites—transaction costs rep-
resent 20 percent or more of the total cost to responsible parties (Probst et al.,
1995). For insurers the numbers are even higher. According to a Rand study, only
'•^  The Clinton administration introduced a bill to corporadze the Air Traffic Control System, a less drastic
move tban the privatization which has occurred in many other countries, but the bill languished in
Congress with a remarkable lack of support among both parties.
'•'' In a sense, this reason for government failure is analogous to the problem of incomplete contracting
widely discussed in the market failure literature.
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12 percent of total insurance company outlays have been spent cleaning up toxic
waste sites, while 80 percent has been spent on their clients and their own legal
fees (Acton and Dixon, 1992). These seem like unnecessarily large transactions
costs. Surely there must be an alternative which can benefit the environment, pro-
vide strong incentives not to pollute in the future, and have economic benefits
today, with only the lawyers being worse off.
We were convinced that such an alternative existed, and carefully crafted an
approach that incorporated a new legal framework and clean-up standards, com-
bined with an effective way of disposing with the myriad of outstanding insurance
cases. We worked hard and long with environmentalists, the affected businesses,
and the insurance industry to forge a consensus that was not just sound and fair,
but perceived that way by the affected parties. That consensus helped the measure
sail through the House Committee on a 40-3 vote, a rare display of bipartisan unity
on such a controversial subject. It failed, however, to be enacted before the mid-
term elections in 1994. When the new Republican Congress arrived, the grand
coalition fell apart. The business community believed that they could get a better
bargain; in fact, all that they got was continued stalemate. They realized that they
were in a new dynamic bargaining game and that the solution that worked for the
previous game might be improved upon. It was, they hoped, no longer an equilib-
rium. Each side was holding out—very much like a strike, where massive amounts
of resources are wasted while waiting for a resolution of the bargaining problem—
in part to demonstrate resolve, in part in the hope that the political dice would, in
the coming years, roll in their favor.'*
The awareness of the dynamic nature of the bargaining game has further re-
percussions. Legislation can help crystallize some groups, and attenuate the
strength of others. It affects the coalitions which are formed, and thereby the out-
comes of political processes. Participants in the political game today realize this,
and hence actions which in the short run might look like a Pareto improvement
can look far riskier from a long-term, dynamic perspective.
3. Destructive Competition
Superfund also illustrates another explanation for the failure of Pareto im-
provements to be enacted. In market economies, we are used to extolling the virtues
of competition. Yet we recognize that in the absence of perfect competition, some-
times competition can be destructive. In imperfectly competitive markets, firms can
get ahead not just by producing a better product at lower costs, but also by raising
'•* There are several interpretations of the stalemate. One is that the business interests believed that they
were in a new game and need to signal their "strength" again by demonstrating their willingness to
continue under the old, inefficient regime. Another interpretation is that these business interests hoped
to have a still more favorable climate in 1996 in which the president and Congress would agree to an
settlement even more beneficial to them. Alternatively, the stalemate in Superfund was not just a bad
equilibrium in a bargaining game with rational players, but pardy due to the lack of understanding of
the players themselves. Another factor in the stalemate may have been lobbyists, a small but influential
group who, unlike the groups they were lobbying for, bad little incentive for a speedy resolution of the
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the costs of their rivals (Salop and Scheffman, 1983). Destructive competition is
most prevalent in zero-sum games where the gains of one are at the expense of
another. Political games, with position to he won or lost, are particularly prone to
this kind of hehavior.'^ Competition in political markets is far from perfect, and
the scope for destructive competition is therefore all the greater.
As the 1994 election approached, Rohert Dole in his role as Senate minority
leader was reluctant to give Clinton a victory—even a victory which could he char-
acterized as hipartisan. Such a victory would have vindicated Clinton's claim that
he could hreak the Congressional gridlock. Even though Dole recognized (or
should have recognized) that were his campaign successful, it would likely mean
that new Superfund legislation would be postponed indefinitely, he decided to use
his considerable power over the agenda to kill the hill in the Senate.
4. Uncertainty About the Consequences of Change
Finally, imperfect information can create an impediment to mutually produc-
tive bargains. In some models of the stock market, no trading takes place because
of information asymmetries. By indicating one's willingness to sell at x, an informed
seller shows that the stock is really worth less than x (ignoring risk aversion); buyers,
knowing that the seller would only sell if they were overpaying, thus refuse to trade.
These information asymmetries limit trade even when differences in risk prefer-
ences and circumstances might, with symmetric information, lead to mutually ad-
vantageous exchanges (Akerlof, 1970). The reason is simple—the buyer is never
sure whether the seller is willing to sell because of inside information which lets
the seller know that the buyer is overpaying, or whether there are grounds for a
mutually beneficial exchange. Similarly in politics, there is often a generalized skep-
ticism about proposals offered by an adversary that leads politicians to think that
anytime an adversary makes a proposal, it must involve the adversary benefitting at
their own expense.'® This skepticism derives not just from the standard asymmetric
information in economic models, but also from the fact that many people lack the
training or patience to understand the consequences of policies.
There is a certain sense in which the "zero sum" view of the world is true.
Competition for electoral votes or House seats is truly zero sum: if the Democrats
gain, then the Republicans lose. If your objective is simply vote maximization,
then you will not find any opportunities to cooperate.'' Furthermore, if you
define your gains in relative terms—how much I won compared to how much
another group won—then any game turns into a zero-sum game: my relative
gains are your relative losses. The fact that the political game—with a winner
'•^  See Frank and Cook (1995). While recent economic literature has emphasized certain advantages of
contests and rank-order tournaments (for example, Stiglitz and Nalebuff, 1983; Lazear and Rosen, 1981),
the increased potential for "destructive competitive actions" is clearly one of the disadvantages.
'" This idea is elaborated on, in a somewhat different context, in Stiglitz (1992).
" Even here there are opportunities to collaborate because although it is a zero-sum game, there are
other players: outsiders. An example of this is the flurry of legislation in the months before the 1996
election which many saw as a collaborative effort by the incumbent president and incumbent Republican
Congress to stay in office.
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and a loser—is zero-sum leads many politicians to see all of the world in a similar
vein. The fact that information is imperfect and the games we play are often not
transparent means that there is always uncertainty. Your gain may indeed be at
my expense.
But poliq', as opposed to politics, is not zero sum. Some policies are Pareto
improvements. One of the hardest tasks of economists is to explain this—a task
made all the more difficult by much of the political rhetoric. Nowhere is the prob-
lem greater than in the area of international trade, ironically an area where econ-
omists have the most developed and convincing arguments for mutual gains. The
main political argument for free trade is that it creates jobs. The Administration
even had an official number that was used to convert the value of exports into a
number of jobs. Unfortunately, this rhetorical justification could be easily turned
against us, and it was. At one Congressional hearing, a Senator asked me if each $1
billion of exports created 20,000 to 25,000 jobs, then would it not also be true that
each $1 billion of imports cost America 20,000 to 25,000 jobs. I had to restrain
myself from pointing out that our imports are probably more labor-intensive than
our exports and thus that each $1 hillion dollars of imports probably "cost" even
more than 25,000 jobs. What I did point out, however, is that the ecowomic justifi-
cation for free trade is not that it creates jobs—this is a matter for macroeconomic
policy combined with flexible labor and product markets—but that it allows us to
take advantage of our comparative advantage, resulting in higher wages and lower
prices (Congress of the United States, 1997). In contrast, the rhetorical link be-
tween trade and jobs puts the discussion squarely back in the zero sum framework.
Similarly, when we look to our trade deficit as a measure of our success, we are
again forced back into the zero sum framework—for the world's trade surpluses by
definition must be zero. It is perhaps ironic that the one area in which economists
have true opportunities for Pareto improvements is the one which the political
process most often looks at from a zero-sum perspective.
The uncertainty about the consequences of policies has an important impli-
cation: complicated policies and arguments have litde place in political discourse.
The public has neither the background nor the patience to digest a complicated
message, so this "simplicity constraint" makes it more difficult to put together
politically appealing reforms which are Pareto improvements. For academics, this
is a hard pill to swallow: we pride ourselves in the subdety of our arguments, not
in their obviousness, in the cleverness of our solutions, not necessarily in their
simplicity. For analysts of government behavior, this "simplicity constraint" is hard
to model, but this makes it no less real. We note, however, that the simplicity con-
straint can move: a few years ago, public discourse involving extended discussions
of adverse selection and moral hazard effects would be unthinkable, yet today they
are commonplace. In this spirit, I hope that some of the ideas I put forward while
at the Council—such as inflation puts,'^ or die creation of what would be in effect
'" Inflation puts would give the holder of the bond the right to sell the bond to the government at a
fixed price if the rate of inflation (or the nominal interest rate) exceeded a certain level, thus limiting
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Arrow-Debreu securities for reinsurance markets associated with natural disasters—
will see the light of day sometime in the future.
While political rhetoric may contribute to our problems, and the necessity of
keeping it simple may make finding Pareto improvements all the more difficult,
the manner in which so much decision-making occurs—the secrecy, the midnight
committee meetings—exacerbate our problems. In the next section I will discuss
steps we can take to build a climate of openness and transparency that allows good
policies to be recognized and promoted.
Secrecy vs. Openness in Decision-Making
Secrecy aggravates the government failures identified above. First, it makes it
harder to establish credible commitments. Those excluded by secrecy from the
process feel fully justified in trying to change the outcomes. Moreover, proposals
arrived at in secret are less likely to have paid due attention to the concerns of
those left out, and in doing so they have increased die incentives of those groups
to overturn the results should an occasion to do so arise in the future. Second,
secrecy aggravates the problem of positional goods and destructive competition. It
short-circuits the consensus process and makes it more likely that outcomes will
lead to a greater divergence between winners and losers. Third, by making infor-
mation scarce, it contributes bodi to both the perception and reality of asymmet-
rical information, and puts into play a dynamic which is more likely to lead to biased
and unrealistic information.
In a world of secrecy, you will always suspect that some interest group is taking
advantage of the secrecy to advance their causes over yours, to steal, if not directly
from you personally, more broadly from the public. Why else the secrecy? There is
plenty of evidence to support these anxieties: the special tax provisions put into
every tax bill at the last moment are perhaps the most glaring example.
This penchant for secrecy extended into the Clinton administration. Why, I
wondered, was there such a focus on secrecy in a Democratic administration, in a
democratic society? We were no worse than previous administrations, and I suspect
we did better than most, but why couldn't we do still better? Whatever our position,
eventually it would have to be debated in the open, in Congress. If our positions
were well thought out, then surely we would be able to withstand pressures from
the special interest groups that would, in any case, eventually be mobilized. Should
a committed democrat (or Democrat) believe that it requires stealth to advance
policies that are in the national interest?
The one argument that may have some merit is that hiding information may
sometimes provide a tactical advantage in the political bargaining game. But my
the down-side risk of holding bonds. The value of inflation puts, like any option, would depend on the
variance of inflation. They would thus allow traders to take positions on the variance of inflation, not
just its mean as they cjui now do with indexed and unindexed bonds.
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own experience is that all too often, secrecy is neither justified by national security
interests, nor as a prerequisite for rational and thoughtful debate, nor even as a
tactical necessity in a broader strategy, but rather, secrecy serves as a cloak behind
which special interests can most effectively advance their interests, outside of public
scrutiny. There is an old expression that sunshine is the most powerful antiseptic.
In this sense, I understood why discussions concerning privatizing the production
of enriched uranium—the critical ingredient of nuclear bombs—bad to proceed
in secrecy. It was not because national security would have been jeopardized, but
because there righdy might have been a public outcry if it was known diat we were
risking nuclear proliferation for at most a meager few hundred million dollars." I
also understood why discussions concerning ethanol had to be conducted in se-
cret—again, private interests seeking favorable treatment might have might have
failed to get what they wanted had there been an open public discussion, especially
amidst accusations that campaign contributions seemed to affect public policy.
But the secrecy mind-set plays out even when there appears no rational rea-
soning for secrecy: Why did discussions of issuing indexed bonds—hardly a matter
of national security—have to proceed in secrecy? Would bond markets really
be rattled by discussions of the possibility of issuing a new Pareto-improving
instrument?
Incentives for Secrecy
Other forces besides special interests and the fear of exposing policy mistakes
help maintain the climate of secrecy. Secrecy creates rents, because the hidden
information is potentially valuable. Whenever a valuable commodity exists, markets
are created. Those on both sides of the market have an incentive for continuing
with the artificially created scarcity. In this market, there are at least two active
parties: government officials and the press. Their exchanges do not direcdy involve
money, but they are just as real. A reporter who gives good coverage, walking care-
fully the line between pandering and honest reporting, gets access to "leaks." Part
of the exchange was an occasional puff piece. We could tell which reporter was in
the hands of which administration official. If all that was at stake was an occasional
puff piece, these would be innocent gift exchanges. But, at least from my vantage
point, all too often the reporting was distorted, the world seen through a particular
lens, not the balanced kind of reporting diat is required for informed public
decision-making. Less secrecy would not only increase the flow of information; it
would reduce the rent<reating and rent-seeking activities which lead to a distorted
flow of information.
Ironically, one of the most powerful arguments for secrecy was premised on
the continued existence of secrecy itself. When die press got wind of an intra-
administration dispute over a policy issue, it would often turn the issue into a big
story, writing about it as if the administration were confused and divided. Although
Even these estimates were based on calculations which ignored the constraints that Congress, under
political pressures, had imposed on the privatized enterprise. For a very good discussion of the privat-
ization of the United States Enrichment Corporation, see Aizenman (1997),
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these were mosdy big stories only for die cognoscenti inside the Beltway, they were
enough to worry many White House officials. Their answer was ever tighter control
to ensure that further stories did not appear. Since it was impossible to entirely
eliminate articles about intra-administration disputes—the incentives to leak were
too powerful—this approach just increased the cost of the stories that did appear.
If instead they had increased the number of stories—increased transparency—they
would have found that the press and public would come to a better understanding
of the deliberative process or, more likely, simply become too bored to raise much
of a problem.
America has led the way in trying to create a more open, transparent political
process. There are landmark pieces of legislation, like the Freedom of Information
Act, which stand in marked contrast to the way that many governments around the
world, even other democracies, conduct their business. I remember, with some
misgivings, having had to sign a pledge to conform to the Official Secrets Act when
I served as a consultant to the British government some years ago. It is ironic,
though, that there remains an obsession with secrecy despite America's social con-
sensus in favor of openness.
Expertise and Democratic Values
There is another arena in which democratic processes and rational decision-
making seemingly come into conflict, in which the resolution is not so apparent.
For a l2irge number of issues, expertise is required. This is, of course, the case in
the running of any complicated business. Good managers either have the expertise
themselves, or know how to hire it. It is not apparent, however, that the political
process sorts well for those who have these abilities. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier,
I was struck by the non-scientific tone of political discourse; since "expert" argu-
ments could not be well evaluated by the electorate, they had little play among
those whose focus was on the electorate.
In recognition of this problem, we have established independent agencies in
many areas to move critical parts of decision-making at least slighdy further from
the political scene. Ultimately, there is political responsibility for the performance
of diese agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Deciding how far to remove what decisions is a key issue in
a world of increasing complexity.
Most of us, for instance, would not want the statistical agencies, like the Bureau
of Labor Statistics or the Bureau of the Census, to be influenced by political pres-
sures. There is therefore a consensus that statistics should be collected at some
distance from the political process. But what about some central issues of macro-
economic policy, such as the trade-off between inflation and unemployment? Fiscal
policy is under control of Congress and the President, which assures some repre-
sentativeness, but it is by no means clear that it assures the country's best expertise.
(Though to be sure, there are incentives for politicians to seek out the best advice.)
As for monetary policy, while the level of expertise at the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors is fairly high, its representativeness can be questioned, since not all of
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its members are even appointed by die president or ratified by the Senate. In either
case, how much secrecy should surround the deliberations?
Making Financial Markets into Tyrants
There is a newly emerging tyranny attempting to suppress democratic discourse
about issues of economic policy that are vital to prosperity—a tyranny said to be
imposed by financial markets. The financial markets, it is said, will be ratded by
open discussions. It is ironic that those who put forward this argument are often
the same people who argue for the rationality of market processes—processes
which should therefore depend not on the cacophony of voices that are heard in
public discourse, but on the reality of the underlying fundamentals. Markets can
be ratded; for example, Alan Greenspan's allusion to "irrational exuberance" did
lead to a market downturn. But while ratded markets may allow a few short-term
speculators to make or lose a few million dollars, there is litde evidence that these
effects are long-lived, unless they trigger systemic effects such as diose associated
with bank runs.
Furthermore, the more often we speak, the less information our individual
statements words will convey. If members of the Federal Open Market Committee
discussed their views about monetary policy more openly and more often, the most
likely effect would be a dampening of financial market volatility. In a sense, the
market for information would be thicker and possibly more stable as each individ-
ual's particulcu- pronouncements would matter less.
The World Bank has taken a similar stand with developing countries and has
strongly encouraged them to become more open and transparent. Secrecy lowers
the risks and costs incurred by government officials who are corrupt. The evidence
in the World Development Report 1997 (World Bank, 1997) catalogs the costs of the
extreme lack of transparency that is so frequendy found in countries with corrupt
governments. We have also tried to reflect these fundamental values in the way that
we ourselves operate.
Adversarial vs. Consensus Systems
So far, I have provided four arguments for why potential Pareto improvements
often are not adopted, and I have shown how the secrecy that surrounds much of
the conduct of government business makes it dW the more difficult to recognize
and design Pareto improvements. There are other aspects to the process by which
public decisions are made which also affect the scope of government failure, in
particular the ability to achieve Pareto improvements.
In particular, the adversarial process in which political discourse occurs makes
achieving Pareto improvements all the more difficult. It shapes both the amount
of information available and, more importandy, the way in which the information
is used. In the market arena, we often recognize the virtues both of competition
and cooperation, and the market economy involves both cooperation within a firm
and competition among firms. The political process involves a similar mixture of
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adversarial and consensus-based systems. We strove to reach consensus within the
Clinton administration, but we were embedded in a highly adversarial political
process. (To be fair, however, the consensus-based rhetoric sometimes only lightly
clothed an underlying adversarial process.)
I believe that a shift to greater reliance on consensus processes is more likely
to lead to Pareto improvements. To see why, let me describe some of the contrasts
between a consensus-based system and an adversarial system.
The first concerns the differences between dialogue and debate. Consensus
requires an open dialogue. You need to get people to understand your position
and persuade them it is the right one. In contrjist, the adversarial system is based
on debate which is more for public consumption than an attempt to forge common
ground for a consensus. Each party deliberately hides weaknesses in its case, lest its
position be undermined. The objective is not to craft a proposal that minimizes the
inevitable risks associated with new policies, but to win a victory in the political
process.
The second contrast relates to national interest versus private interests. The
success of a consensus-based system requires some shared conception of the na-
tional interests. The adversarial system only requires that each group express its
own interests and that these interests be aggregated by voting or some other pro-
cedure. In the consensus-based system, in contrast, each player needs to have both
the process and the social outcome in that player's utility function. Reaching con-
sensus is an outcome that is valued in its own right, and reaching consensus in a
democratic and open way is a process that is valued in its ovm right.
It is worth noting that in public discourse, everyone appeals to the national
interest, even when seeking their own private interests. In arguing for ethanol sub-
sidies, of which it was a major beneficiary, the Archer Daniels Midland Company
appealed to tbe favorable impact on the environment and the economy. Among
both environmentalists and economists, there is a virtual consensus that the ethanol
subsidy is bad for the economy and bad for the environment. We were so convinced
of this conclusion that the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers put together a biomass proposal that almost Pareto-
dominated ethanol subsidies—only the Archer Daniels Midland Company (and a
few smaller producers) would be worse ofif, and we could have compensated them.
The false appeal to national interests is particularly pernicious in the interna-
tional arena, where it is easy to convince those who don't understand economics
that protecting a particular industry's profits increases the total number of Ameri-
can jobs and the American economy. In this case, appealing to a zero-sum version
of the world is easy. The zero-sum model is, obviously, harder to apply as a basis
for claiming that purely domestic "special interest" decisions benefit the country
as a whole. This is why intemational issues are probably more subject to capture.
The third contrast refers to when issues are believed to be setded. In a
consensus-based system, an issue is over when everyone has come to a mutually
acceptable agreement. Because the process by which a decision is made is viewed
to be fair, even the "losers" feel committed to upholding it; juid because the con-
sensus process typically provides some accommodation to all parties, there is a sense
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in which no one need feel defined as a loser. As a result, once an issue has been
decided, it is likely that the issue will stay closed, at least until a major change in
the world occurs. In an adversarial system, issues are never closed—if you have
enough votes to bring something back, you will. The issue is never over. No gov-
ernment can commit the succeeding one. Of course, each side recognizes this, and
therefore great efforts are made to create inefficient transactions costs, costs which
make reversals all the more difficult, and which give greater pride of place to the
status quo.
A consensus-based system is thus able to mitigate some of the problems I dis-
cussed earlier—such as inability to commit and the resort to destructive competi-
tion. In this way, it may make it possible to implement Pareto-improving policies
that would not be achievable under an adversarial system.
At the World Bank, we have been studying the economic impact of these par-
ticipatory/consensus processes. My predecessor as Chief Economist, Michael
Bruno, emphasized the importance of consensus building in ending inflations
(Bruno, 1993). The reason for this should be obvious: if workers believe that they
are not being fairly treated, they may impose inflationary wage and other demands,
making the resolution of the inflationary pressures all but impossible. At the mi-
croeconomic level, aid agencies and non-governmental organizations have been
experimenting with ways of providing decentralized support and encouraging com-
munity participation in the selection, design, and implementation of projects. Re-
cent research provides preliminary support for this approach. One study found the
success rate for rural water projects that involved participation was substantially
higher than the success rate for those that did not (Isham et al., 1995). It is not
just that localized information is brought to bear in a more effective way; but the
commitment to the project leads to the long-term support (or "ownership" in the
vernacular) which is required for sustainability.
It is this commitment and involvement which many believe is the key to success
of "choice" experiments in education—an effect far more important than the far-
from-perfect competition that such experiments create among schools.
I do not want to sound PoUyannaish: participation and consensus formation
should be valued in their own right, and may lead to better outcomes, but this is
not necessarily the case, especially where expertise plays a large role. Studies have
noted that there was little correlation between non-expert assessments of environ-
mental hazards and the assessments of experts (EPA, 1987; Slovic et al., 1993). If
the objective of environmental policy is to achieve better health outcomes—and
not just better feelings about the environment—then the decision-making process
must rely heavily on expertise. At the same time, the boundaries between partici-
pation and expertise are not fixed. Education processes, and more generally, what
we at the World Bank call capacity building, can expand and enhance participation
by helping people better understand the issues.
Of course, consensus formation should not be misconstrued as stifiing discus-
sion and debate, which is one of the virtues of the advocacy process, which allows




Let me conclude with the following general observations. Before I came to
Washington, one of my good friends advised me strongly against accepting the offer.
He argued that the academic's role in our society was to be the critic. As em insider,
I would not be free to express my views. Anyone who has served in my position
knows the tension: they cany on with the belief that they can be more effective as
an inside player, articulating within the administration the economic rationale for
their positions as clearly and simply as possible. There is close to a perfectly elastic
supply of those willing to serve as outspoken outside critics. (There is also a ten-
dency for the insiders to try to exploit the asymmetries of information which they
themselves have worked to create: how often does one hear, "if you only knew the
full story. . ." Fortunately, in economic issues, such secret details rarely change
the overall picture.) In my time in Washington, I did have to be less outspoken
publicly than I would have liked, but I have become a potentially more informed
critic.
Having spent so much time looking at the implications of information prob-
lems for market failure, it was natural for me to address the issue of explaining
government failures through an analysis of information problems there. In this
lecture, I have stressed the difficulties of achieving Pareto improvements. What I
have really shown is how hard it is to construct these Pareto improvements amidst
the problems of commitment and the dynamic bargaining games that characterize
the political process. Those who said that I would leave the White House with a
more jaundiced view of the role of government were only pardy correct. While
special interests do often dominate over the general interests and while seeming
near-Pareto improvements are often resisted, these failures do not undo the great
achievements of the public sector, from mass education to a cleaner environment.
These failures should focus our attention on re-examining both how and what the
government should do.
Making government processes more open, transparent, and democratic, with
more pEurticipation and more efforts at consensus formation is likely to result not
only in a process that is fairer, but one with outcomes that are more hkely to be in
accord vnxh the general interests. Maybe eventually we will be able to bring Coase
to the public sector, so that Pareto improvements vnll actually be adopted.
• The ideas expressed in this lecture are solely the responsibility of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the institution which he is or has been affiliated with. This
paper is a revised version of the lecture delivered by the author to a joint session of the Society
of Government Economists and the American Economic Association at the annual meetings
of the Allied Social Science Association in Chicago, Illinois, on January 4, 1998. Jason
Furman offered invaluable insights throughout the evolution of the paper andfessica Seddon
provided able research and editing assistance. Comments from Brad De Long, Alan Krueger,
Timothy Taylor, and participants at the Society of Government Economists lecture were very
helpful in preparing this written version.
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